We test whether the political regime inuences the volume of trade. In contrast to the existing literature we use individual importing and exporting country data, rather than a dyad set up. We nd that autocracies trade substantially less even after controlling for trade restrictions. This nding is very stable and does not depend on a particular set-up or estimation technique. We propose that trade ows contain information about the outside world and autocrats want to minimize this information in their country. More information about the outside world allows the citizens to evaluate the performance of their political leaders.
Introduction
Economic and political liberalization is the focus of an ever increasing line of literature. The focus of these works is wide spread. Among the topics analyzed are the determinants of democracy (Barro, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2005) and economic freedom (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003) as well as the relationship between both variables (Sturm and de Haan, 2003; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2004) . 1 The focus of this paper is to test whether a country's democracy level inuences its trade volume. This topic has drawn interest in the political science literature but not so much in the economic literature. Manseld, Milner and Rosendor (2000) demonstrate that the political regime inuences international trade ows in a country pair set-up. They show theoretically and empirically that pairs of democracies trade more than pairs consisting of a democracy and an autocracy. Their model does not allow to predict trade ows of pairs of autocratic states as those ows would depend on the preferences of the two dictators. Empirically, these pairs do not dier from democratic pairs.
£ ETH Zurich, KOF and Department of Management, Technology and Economics; Weinbergstrasse 35; Switzerland; gassebner@mtec.ethz.ch 1 Recently convergence and contagion trends of the two variables have been studied (Nieswiadomy and Strazicich, 2004; Gassebner and Lamla, 2005) . Furthermore, the inuence of both measures on macroeconomic variables is attracting great interest (e.g. de Haan and Siermann, 1996; de Haan and Sturm, 2000; Sturm and de Haan, 2001) . 2 Especially with their theoretical considerations and the inclusion of mixed and autocratic pairs they enhance previous work by Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1998) that only include pairs of democracies. Morrow and colleagues also nd that democracies trade more.
The empirical analysis of this study covers years until 1990. The authors concluded that in the later time periods autocratic pairs tend to trade signicantly less as compared to democratic pairs. Dai (2002) concludes that the theoretical ndings of Manseld, Milner and Rosendor (2000) depend on the preferences of the executives and that it is therefore not generally true that democratic pairs trade more than mixed pairs. However, Manseld, Milner and Rosendor (2002) show that she is only able to nd this because she is altering the model assumptions without stating so. Milner and Kubota (2005) test whether democratization led to trade policy liberalizations in developing countries. They rst provide descriptive evidence that trade protection fell substantially in developing countries particularly since the mid-1980s. They argue that this is driven by the preceding period of political liberalization. The link between democratization and freer trade is the enlargement of the electorate yielding a shift of the median voter/supporter. The new median voter is a member of the capital-endowed labor force. Given that developing countries have an advantage in the production of capital-intensive goods, the new median voter is beneting from trade liberalization. The authors show empirically that the democracy level is one of the main determinants of trade policy in a country. This nding prevails even after controlling for other prominently proposed determinants such as external pressures, economic crisis and the time in oce of the political leaders.
The present paper extends the literature in two ways. On the one hand, it oers a new theoretical reasoning which explains way autocracies trade less than democracies. On the other hand, it improves the empirical literature by estimating the eects of a single country being democratic or not rather than just dyads. Furthermore, it uses a much larger dataset, i.e. a longer and more recent time horizon and deeper country coverage.
Theoretical idea (preliminary)
Trade increases welfare of citizens: Exports increase personal income; imports increase personal utility (higher variety of goods, lower prices). The model could also incorporate industrial interest groups that lobby for protectionist measures (to maximize the rents generated in this sector).
Furthermore, trade ows (both outward and inward) contain ows of information about the outside world. These are transmitted either directly via personal contact (custom ocer { shipping agent) or indirectly via imported goods that expand the knowledge in the country. It could also be possible to extend Rosendor's (2006) model and include the idea of the information ows.
In a democracy reelection chances of the incumbent rise with the expected welfare of citizens (i.e. politicians maximize the political support function, Hillman, 1982) . However, higher campaign contributions by protection-seeking lobbyists also enhance the chances of winning the election. Thus the equilibrium trade ow is determined by maximizing the reelection probability or the incumbent's utility. This could be modelled in line with Grossman and Helpman (1994) .
In an autocracy, the dictator deviates from this equilibrium level. He additionally wants to minimize the level of outside information that reaches the country. Without \interference" he can claim to be a benevolent dictator. However, if the citizens can update their information by new input from outside they might be able to reveal the dictator as a rent-seeking leader. Additionally, the dictator might be more prone to lobbying activities since this can stimulate his personal rentseeking. He might also set taris as to maximize tari revenue (which would yield a higher tax rate as in the democracy) since he can easily appropriate this revenue. This would be in line with Congleton (1992) who nds that dictators have shorter time horizons and thus chose a less strict environmental policy than optimal. In the trade case dictators set a higher than optimal tari rate.
This could also hint to an alternative explanation for the lower trade ows: Dictatorships, or more generally less developed countries, commonly have not (yet) developed eciently functioning institutions, such as a tax collectors oce. They indeed generate some of the federal revenue via taris since taris are easy to collect. However, if the tari eect would be the only transmission mechanism then the eect of autocracies should not be present if taxes are incorporated. This can be tested empirically. In order to do so we include the restriction sub-index from Dreher's (2006) globalization index in the regressions. The negative signicance of the autocracy variable does not disappear. If autocracies still have a dierent trade pattern after the inclusion of this index we can conclude that the tari channel is not the only transmission channel.
Empirical Model and Variables
In order to estimate the eects of the political regime on international trade we employ a standard gravity set-up. The basic specication is the following: ln(rimp iet ) = dem it 1 + dem et 1 + ln(gdp it ) + ln(gdp et ) + lock iet + ln(dist iet ) +X iet + i + e + t + e iet (1) where rimp iet represents the nominal imports of country i from country e in year t deated by the US GDP deator, dem it 1 and dem et 1 represent the lagged democracy score of the importing and exporting country, respectively, gdp it and gdp et stand for the real GDP of the importer and the exporter, lock iet is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if at least one trading partner is land locked, dist iet is the distance between the most populated cities of the trading pair, X iet is a set of dummy variables measuring colonial ties comprising the following variables: the two countries share the same ocial language (common language), the trading partners have a common border (common border ), pairs that were ever in a colonial relationship (colonial ties ), a common colonizer post 1945 (common colonizer ), colonial relationships post 1945 (colony post 1945 ), and a dummy taking the value of 1 if the partners are or were the same nation (same country ).
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In using this set-up we are able to distinguish the eect of the democracy level for an importing from those of an exporting country. Furthermore, this country level set-up detects the eect of a particular country being autocratic. This is not possible in the pair wise set-up of Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1998) or Manseld, Milner and Rosendor (2000) .
Given the diculty of quantifying democracy, we use three dierent indicators as proxies. The rst indicator is the Polity IV score as published by Gurr et al. (2003) . This variable actually represents the variable \polity2", which is the dierence between a countries democracy and autocracy score. It originally runs from -10 to 10 with higher numbers indicating higher levels of democracy. In order to make the results of this indicator comparable to the other measures used we transform the variable to run from 1 to 21 with higher values indicating higher levels of autocracy. The second indicator we employ is taken from Freedom House (2005) . We calculate the average of the two indicators \Political Rights" and \Civil Liberties". The resulting variable runs from 1 to 7 where higher values again indicate higher levels of autocracy. Our nal measure of the political regime is taken from Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) with updates until 2000 coming from Cheibub and Ghandi (2004) . Przeworski and colleagues dene democracy essentially as a political system in which incumbents can lose elections and comply with the results. More specically, they require that the executive and the legislature be lled through contested elections, where more than one party has a chance of winning. As a result of their analysis they develop a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for autocracies and zero otherwise.
It is hard to say which of the indices is \best". Depending on academic origin and school of thought the opinions on these measures vary. The Polity IV measure has been criticised for the way the values are assigned to the various subcomponents. Freedom House sometimes draws criticism because it is completely survey based. The Przeworski measure uses the most clear cut denition of the three but has the disadvantage of being a dummy variable without \scales of grey". Milner and Kubota (2005) argue that the eect of democratic transition on trade policy is long-lasting. Therefore, the democracy measures are included once as a one year lag and once as the average of the ve preceding years. The inclusion of lagged democracy also avoids potential endogeneity problems of trade and democracy.
Our dependent variable, real import ows, comes from Feenstra (2000) In choosing these standard gravity variables we basically follow the selection of Rose (2004) . We have no interest in these variables apart from their serving as control variables in our analysis. However, they are all signicant and have the correct sign. However, in contrast to Rose we focus on i's imports from e rather than bilateral trade ows. This avoids what Baldwin (2006) calls the \silver-medal of gravity mistakes". He shows that averaging bilateral trade ows as the dependent variable in the usual manner may lead to potentially sizeable upward biases when a country pair's trade is imbalanced.
All regressions include xed eects for the importing and exporting country ( i , e ) as well as in the time dimension ( t ). This is a variant of correcting for country-specic characteristics adopted from Feenstra (2004) who introduced the notion of country-specic eects as multilateral resistance terms. Inclusion of country xed eects controls for unobservable country characteristics. By incorporating xed eects for importers and exporters we allow these unobservable eects to dier even if the same country is involved in importing and exporting. The importance of correcting for these importer, exporter and time xed eects is pointed out by Baltagi, Egger and Pfaenmayer (2003) as well as Baldwin (2006) who calls the omission of these eects the \gold-medal of gravity mistakes".
To test whether the tari channel is the only transmission mechanism through which autocracies dier with respect to trade ows we include a measure of trade restrictions in equation (1). Given the various forms that these restrictions can take on and the diculty of measuring trade policy (see Milner and Kubota, 2005) we opt to include a multidimensional index. Therefore, we take the restriction sub-index from the KOF Index of Globalization (see Dreher, 2006) . This subindex contains data on: hidden import barriers, mean tari rate, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions. It ranges from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating less restrictions.
Results
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are shown in Table 1 . As can be seen, all control variables have the correct sign and are highly signicant with the exception of the landlockedness dummy variable. Given the numerous amount of gravity studies we refrain from interpreting the results of the covariates. 6 It is apparent that all three democracy measures yield the same result: autocracies trade signicantly less. The results have one more common factor. The results for the average democracy score of the previous ve years generally yield higher coecients. This indicates that the eect of democracy on trade is very persitent which is in line with the ndings of Milner and Kubota (2005) . Furthermore, this suggests that changes in the trade ows take place gradually after a regime change.
Given its dichotomous nature Przeworski's measure is the easiest to interpret. Non-democracies have 23.7% less imports and 20.2% less exports (28.6% less imports and 21.8% less exports, when taking the average of the previous ve years), all else being equal. Both the Polity IV and the Freedom House scores are measured on an ordinal scale. The result for the Polity IV score implies that a one point move towards more autocracy reduces imports by 1.8% and exports by 1.2% (2.3% and 1.4% in the lagged average case), ceteris paribus. This means that a move from total democracy to total autocracy would result in a loss of 36% of imports and 24% of exports. When looking at the Freedom House results, a move from being totally democratic to being completely autocratic would lead to a loss of 33% of the imports and 30% of the exports (47.4% imports and 27.6% exports for the averages). In order to compare the Polity IV and the Freedom house scores let's consider a switch from Switzerland's level of democracy to the level of Myanmar: In the year 2003, this would have induced a reduction of imports and exports of 29.6% and 20.4% according to Polity IV and 33% and 30% according to Freedom House, ceteris paribus. As one can see, although there are dierences, all three indicators yield results of comparable magnitude. Milner and Kubota (2005) show that democracies have lower tari rates, in a set of developing countries. Thus the democracy result of Table 1 could simply be a result of this nding. Therefore, we add the restriction index as described in the previous section to equation (1) and rerun the estimation. The results are shown in Table 2 . Again, all control variables have the correct sign and are highly signicant with the exception of the landlockedness measure. Not surprisingly, the restriction indicator is positive and highly signicant for the importing country. This means that the less restrictions a country has the more imports it will have. For the exporting country the coecients are marginally positive which could be interpreted as a \reward", i.e. a country exports more if it lowers its import barriers. However, one has to be careful not to overinterpret this result.
Besides the low signicance level, the coecient is substantially smaller for the exporter implying less of an eect.
Turning to the results of the democracy variables only minor changes become visible. Although the coecients for the Polity IV and the Prezeworski measure are somewhat lower they are still highly signicant. The Freedom House indicator remains virtually unchanged. Thus the main nding of Table 1 persists: autocracies trade less. Moreover, this nding shows that the tari channel as identied by Milner and Kubota (2005) is not the only transmission mechanism.
To see whether this result is sensitive to changes in the specication we conduct robustness tests. We use the specication including the restriction index as our baseline model (i.e. Table 2 ). When then include additional variables that were proposed by e.g. Rose (2004) as determinants of international trade ows. These additional variables are: log of GDP per capita, log of population, a dummy variable indicating a common currency, a dummy variable indicating a generalized system of preferences, a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the trading partners are members in the same regional trading agreement, a dummy indicating WTO/GATT membership, and, nally, all of the above at the same time.
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The results of this robustness test is presented in Table 3 . Given that our main focus lies on the results of the democracy variables only these coecients are displayed in the table. We see that the results are not much aected by the inclusion of additional variables. The signicance level remains unchanged and the changes in the coecients are miniscule at most.
To further elaborate on the robustness of our results we employ dierent estimation techniques and check if our ndings are sensitive to changes in the sample. Again the specication of Table  2 is used as the base. These results are presented in Table 4 . Just as before, only the outcomes for the democracy variables are displayed.
As a rst step, we rerun the estimations using reweighted least squares (RLS). This robust regression technique weighs observations in an iterative process. Starting with OLS, estimates are obtained through weighted least squares where observations with relatively large residuals get smaller weights. We see that the estimates remain highly signicant although they lose some of their magnitude. It is striking that it is mainly the coecient for the importing country that is reduced in size. Comparing the coecients of Tables 2 and 4 we see that the coecients for the importer are approximately halved while the coecients for the exporter change only minimally.
Next, we use the least absolute value estimator (also known as mean absolute deviation (MAD) or L1 norm regression) which minimizes the sum of the absolute deviations about the median. This produces similar results similar results as the RLS estimation, although the importer coecients of the Polity IV and the Przeworski measures lose additional magnitude. However, they remain highly signicant.
In the following step, we alter the sample and test whether this has consequences for the results. Feenstra's (2000) data is based on this data source. We see that the extension of the data does not change the results much.
Finally we reduce the sample of Table 2 to include only developing countries as importers and exporters, respectively. 8 We see that this reduces the magnitude of the respective coecient but with the exception of the Polity IV measure for the exporting case this does not alter the level of signicance.
All our robustness test lead to the conclusion the empirical result is very stable and does not depend on a particular set-up or estimation technique.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the role of the political regime in determining a country's international trade ows. We use a standard gravity model and distinguish between the eects of an importing and exporting country. We nd that autocracies trade signicantly less. We use three dierent measures of democracy to cope with the diculty of quantifying this phenomenon. All three indicators yield similar results. Given its dichotomous nature, the measure developed by Prezeworski et al. (2000) is the easiest to interpret. We nd that the eects of this indicator imply that autocracies have between 4.3% and 23.3% less imports and between 16.1% and 19.7% less exports, ceteris paribus. This eect persists even after controlling for trade restriction that have previously been name as one transmission channel (Milner and Kutoba, 2005) . Furthermore, these results are robust to changes in the specication, sample and the estimation technique. 8 We follow the WTO convention of coding following countries as developed: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA. All other countries are coded as developing. (t-1{t-5) represents the average of the ve years prior to the observation; i and e indicate importing and exporting country, respectively. Polity IV is the Variable \poliy2" from Gurr et al. (2003) and is transformed to run from 1 to 21, Freedom House is the average of the \civil liberties" and \political rights" indicators from Freedom House (2005) and ranges from 1 to 7, higher numbers reect higher levels of autocracy in both cases. Przeworski et al. is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for autocratic states. It is taken from Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) with updates until 2000 coming from Cheibub and Ghandi (2004) . All regressions contain importer-, exporter-and time-specic xed eects all of which are signicant at the 1% level. £ / ££ / £££ indicates signicance at the 10/5/1-% signicance level; t-statistics are given in italics below the coecient. (t-1{t-5) represents the average of the ve years prior to the observation; i and e indicate importing and exporting country, respectively. Polity IV is the Variable \poliy2" from Gurr et al. (2003) and is transformed to run from 1 to 21, Freedom House is the average of the \civil liberties" and \political rights" indicators from Freedom House (2005) and ranges from 1 to 7, higher numbers reect higher levels of autocracy in both cases. Przeworski et al. is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for autocratic states. It is taken from Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) with updates until 2000 coming from Cheibub and Ghandi (2004) . The trade restriction index is taken from Dreher (2006) . All regressions contain importer-, exporter-and time-specic xed eects all of which are signicant at the 1% level. £ / ££ / £££ indicates signicance at the 10/5/1-% signicance level; t-statistics are given in italics below the coecient. (t-1{t-5) is the average of the ve years prior to the observation; i and e stand for importing and exporting country, respectively; (i and e) indicate separate variables for importing and exporting countries. Polity IV is the Variable \poliy2" from Gurr et al. (2003) and is transformed to run from 1 to 21, Freedom House is the average of the \civil liberties" and \political rights" indicators from Freedom House (2005) and ranges from 1 to 7, higher numbers reect higher levels of autocracy in both cases. Przeworski et al. is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for autocratic states. It is taken from Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) with updates until 2000 coming from Cheibub and Ghandi (2004) . Only the results for the democracy variables is shown in the table. However, the base specication is taken from Table 2 . All regressions contain importer-, exporter-and time-specic xed eects all of which are signicant at the 1% level. £ / ££ / £££ indicates signicance at the 10/5/1-% signicance level; t-statistics are given in italics below the coecient. a Due to perfect collinearity population is excluded in the estimation. (t-1{t-5) is the average of the ve years prior to the observation; i and e stand for importing and exporting country, respectively. Polity IV is the Variable \poliy2" from Gurr et al. (2003) and is transformed to run from 1 to 21, Freedom House is the average of the \civil liberties" and \political rights" indicators from Freedom House (2005) and ranges from 1 to 7, higher numbers reect higher levels of autocracy in both cases. Przeworski et al. is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for autocratic states. It is taken from Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) with updates until 2000 coming from Cheibub and Ghandi (2004) . Only the results for the democracy variables is shown in the table. However, the base specication is taken from Table 2 . All regressions contain importer-, exporter-and time-specic xed eects all of which are signicant at the 1% level. £ / ££ / £££ indicates signicance at the 10/5/1-% signicance level; t-statistics are given in italics below the coecient. Rose (2004) regional trade agreement dummy for pairs that are a member of the same regional trade agreement Rose (2004) WTO membership* dummy for WTO/GATT members WTO (2006) * for these variables i and e indicate the values of an importing and exporting country, respectively.
